In the case where beliefs are ambiguous and represented by multiple priors, a decision maker (DM)'s updating behavior may also include a revision and refinement of her initial belief, a process which is absent from the Bayesian updating. As known in the literature, Maximum Likelihood (ML) updating provides one method of such refinement. The present paper provides an axiomatization of ML for preferences admit Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) representation.
Introduction
For decisions under uncertainty, when sufficient information to pin down a unique probability for uncertainty is lacking, the decision maker (DM)'s revealed preference sometimes is not consistent with any probabilistic belief but is consistent with a belief of multiple priors. (Ellsberg 1961[5] , Machina and Schmeidler 1992[16] ) If this DM learns additional information, on one hand she is able to update every prior in her belief just as in the Bayesian updating, meanwhile on the other hand, this information may provide some evidence for the DM to revise and refine her initial belief by making inference about the plausibility of each prior, a process which is absent from Bayesian updating.
This type of inference is essential in non-Bayesian statistics. For example, maximum likelihood estimation makes inference about the parameter values based on the likelihood of generating the observed data. Its counterpart in the ambiguity literature is Maximum Likelihood (ML) updating, in which the DM updates only the priors in her initial belief that attain maximum likelihood of the observed event; i.e., only those priors are deemed to be plausible. In contrast, another well-known updating rule, Full Bayesian (FB) 1 , updates all the priors in an initial belief; in other words, it allows no such inference.
I take an axiomatic approach and follow the multiple prior representation provided by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) [7] , known as Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU), in which the DM evaluates her decision according to the worst possibility. Under MEU preferences, FB is the most popular updating rule in applications, while ML does not receive much attention. Because first, the characterization of ML under MEU is still incomplete to the best of my knowledge, and more importantly, ML is regarded as too "extreme" for updating only the maximum likelihood priors. (Even though, FB happens to be the other extreme.)
The present paper offers solutions for both of these issues.
Contingent Reasoning
For the sake of introduction, a minimum number of notations are provided here and the formal definitions for the primitives can be found in section 2. Let Ω be the state space and X be the set of all simple lotteries over a set of consequences. An act f is a function maps from Ω to X, and let F denote the set of all acts. For each event E ⊆ Ω, let f E x denote an act that maps each ω ∈ E to f (ω) and maps each ω ∈ E c to x. Let denote a DM's ex-ante preference, and E denote the conditional preference once event E occurs. Both preferences admit MEU representations 2 .
In dynamic choice, a natural way of relating the DM's ex-ante preference to conditional preferences is by Contingent Reasoning (CR). For example, suppose the DM finds that given some conditional event E, she is indifferent between an act f and a lottery x. Consider then the case where she compares the two acts f E h and x E h for some h ∈ F under ex-ante preference. If the DM compares these two acts contingently on whether event E occurs, notice that conditional on event E she is indifferent between f and x, meanwhile when the complement of event E happens, both acts specify exactly the same act h. Because of this, CR requires that she should be further indifferent between the two acts f E h and x E h ex-ante. Formally, CR requires that if f ∼ E x, then f E h ∼ x E h for all h ∈ F. 3 In fact, Bayesian updating always satisfies CR.
However, when preferences admit MEU representation, it is well known that neither FB nor ML satisfies CR for all h ∈ F (e.g. in the three-colored Ellsberg's example). Yet it is still true that, under some special h ∈ F, the implication of CR is preserved. Under FB, Pires (2002) [19] 's result shows that CR is preserved when h = x for f ∼ E x. In other words, if the act received on the complement of event E is exactly the DM's conditional certainty equivalence of the act f , then the implication of CR still applies to that act. Furthermore, Pires(2002) [19] 's result also shows that, imposing the Contingent Reasoning for Conditional Certainty Equivalence (CR-CCE) axiom is sufficient to characterize FB updating.
Meanwhile for ML, it is known in the literature that Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) [8] identifies an axiom to characterize ML only when preference admits both MEU and CEU (Choquet expected utility) representations. Their axiom also features a special case of CR, yet the problem of their axiom is that, it does not always hold for ML updating of preferences, admitting only MEU representation. A slight modification of their axiom, the Contingent Reasoning for Large Consequences (CR-LC) axiom, will be shown in Theorem 2.2 of the present paper to be necessary and sufficient for ML under MEU preferences 4 .
Relative Maximum Likelihood
To capture an intermediate updating behavior between FB and ML, the present paper proposes the Relative Maximum Likelihood (RML) updating rule. Formally, let C denote the initial set of priors, and for each conditional event E, let C * (E) denote the set of priors in C that attain maximum likelihood of event E. For some parameter α ∈ [0, 1], RML selects the following set of priors C α (E) for updating when event E occurs: C α (E) = (1 − α)C + αC * (E) = {(1 − α)p + αq : ∀p ∈ C and ∀q ∈ C * (E)} Geometrically, the set C α (E) is a linear contraction of the set C with C * (E) being the center. Notice that it reduces to FB or ML when α equals 0 or 1 respectively. In this sense, the parameter α captures a relative attitude towards ML with respect to FB, as α = 0 and α = 1 capture the extreme relative attitudes.
The most general result (Theorem 3.4) of the present paper shows that RML can be characterized by the following three axioms: Undershooting for conditional certainty equivalence and Overshooting for large consequence (U-O), Act Consistency (AC) and Event Consistency (EC). Furthermore the parameter α is unique if there exists E ∈ Σ such that C = C * (E).
The U-O axiom relaxes both the CR-CCE and CR-LC axioms. Under this axiom, whenever the DM is conditionally indifferent between an act f and a consequence x, on one hand, her ex-ante preference always undershoots for CR with respect to conditional certainty equivalence such that she finds f E x x. On the other hand, her ex-ante preference always overshoots for CR with 3 It should be noted that a very similar notion for dynamic choice called Dynamic Consistency is different from Contingent Reasoning, even though in most of the updating rules these two are equivalent. (In the sense that if one is true then the other is as well.) Dynamic consistency, as extensively discussed in Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) [10] , requires the other direction of implication: if f E h ∼ x E h for all h ∈ F, then f ∼ E x. 4 With additional technical assumption as specified in section 2. ML under MEU without such assumption is characterized by Theorem B.1 by a slightly different axiom. respect to large consequence such that she also finds f E x *
x E x * for all x * that is sufficiently large.
Given U-O axiom holds, both AC and EC axioms are consistency requirements such that they restrict the DM's updating behavior to be consistent across different acts and events. Notably, if one drops the EC axiom, Theorem 3.3 shows that the U-O and AC axioms together are sufficient to characterize a type of RML updating rule where the relative attitude parameter α[E] might be different across events. This representation allows for the the possibility that, for example, a DM may update with FB (α = 0) when the maximum likelihood of some conditional event E is relatively high, but also may choose to update with ML (α = 1) when the maximum likelihood of another event E is too low. Apparently, such flexibility is not allowed if one instead imposes the CR-CCE axiom or the CR-LC axiom.
Motivation
In many applications of ambiguity, FB is often the only updating rule being considered (Bose and Renou 2014 [2] , Beauchene et al. 2018 [1] , Kellner and Le Quement 2018 [15] ). These applications all feature in a special environment such that the signals are ambiguous but could also be informative. In the following, I use a stylized example to illustrate that, arguably, the predictions of RML updating for all α ∈ [0, 1] are equally reasonable, while FB considers only the one special case when α = 0. Example 1. There are two possible states of the world {θ 1 , θ 2 } with objective prior p(θ 1 ) = β ∈ (0, 1). Consider a bet f pays 1 at θ 1 and nothing at θ 2 . Let {s 1 , s 2 } be the set of signals and consider the following signaling structure: λ(s 1 |θ 1 ) = [1/2, 1] λ(s 1 |θ 2 ) = λ(s 2 |θ 2 ) = 1/2 Namely, the signals are ambiguous when the true state is θ 1 , as it generates the signal s 1 with possible probability from 1/2 to 1; whereas the signals are probabilistic when the true state is s 2 , as it generates s 1 with probability 1/2.
The grand state space of this example is Ω = {θ 1 , θ 2 } × {s 1 , s 2 }. Each µ ∈ [1/2, 1] is able to uniquely specify a prior p µ ∈ ∆(Ω) as the following:
Suppose the DM forms a subjective belief C that coincides with the set of priors {p µ ∈ ∆(Ω) : µ ∈ [1/2, 1]}. Then if she observes the signal s 1 , under FB she updates every p µ in her belief, which results in the following set of posteriors of θ 1 :
: µ ∈ [1/2, 1] = β, 2β 1 + β and her evaluation of the bet f is given by its lower bound, β, that is the same as her prior. Hence, in this example, a FB updating DM is cautious or pessimistic with this possibly informative signal s 1 and treats it as a non-informative signal when evaluating bets on θ 1 .
On the other hand, under ML, the DM updates only the prior p µ with µ = 1 that gives the maximum likelihood of the signal s 1 . Namely, when the DM observes the signal s 1 , she infers that the true correlation between signals and states has to be the one maximizing the likelihood of it. This results in a single posterior:
Her evaluation of the bet f becomes 2β 1+β . Contrasting to FB, ML in this example describes a DM's being fully confident of the informativeness of signal s 1 upon seeing it, no matter what bet she is evaluating.
Observe that the evaluation of bet f under FB and ML are the two extreme cases, and they come from two distinct perspectives of the ambiguous signal s 1 . However, these two rules together cannot cover a large family of scenarios in which a DM might be willing to make an inference with respect to the maximum likelihood but may not be willing only to update the maximum likelihood priors. For instance, it is reasonable for a DM to think that a close neighborhood of the maximum likelihood priors is almost as likely to generate the observed event and thus are also plausible.
In this example, any prior belief p µ for µ ∈ [1/2, 1] could be reasonable to guide the DM's conditional preference if she believes that such prior is plausible given signal s 1 . Indeed under RML, upon seeing the signal s 1 , the DM's updates the following set of priors:
and the set of posteriors is given by:
for some parameter α ∈ [0, 1] and her evaluation of the bet f is the lower bound β+αβ 1+αβ , which ranges from β to 2β 1+β for α from 0 to 1. Thus, RML does not exclude any possible evaluation of f between the two extremes given by FB and ML. Furthermore, different α captures different attitudes towards updating, and in this example one can further interpret α as the degree of how informative the DM finds the signal s 1 .
Related Literature
The closest papers with respect to the present paper are those of Pires (2002) [19] , Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) [8] and Horie (2013) [14] as mentioned in the other sections. I discuss other related papers in the following.
The present paper adds to the literature on dynamic choice under ambiguity by characterizing a new updating rule, RML. It is well known that for ambiguity sensitive choice, one cannot preserve both dynamic consistency and consequentialism at the same time (Hanany and Klibanoff 2007[10] , Siniscalchi 2009[23] ). RML takes the consequentialist approach and relaxes dynamic consistency since it belongs to the same family of updating rules as FB and ML, both of which are well known to violate dynamic consistency (e.g. in Ellsberg's three-colored urn example). Along another route, Klibanoff (2007, 2009) [10] [11] axiomatize updating rules that preserve dynamic consistency yet do not require consequentialism.
The idea of revising and refining initial belief as new information arrives is essential in many different non-Bayesian updating rules, and it is also not an exclusive feature for beliefs with multiple priors. When the initial belief is a singleton, for example, Ortoleva (2012) [17] characterizes a hypothesis testing updating rule such that if the likelihood of information received is too low under the initial belief, then the DM will revise that initial belief and find a different prior for updating. Since the initial belief is probabilistic, the hypothesis testing updating rule emphasizes on dealing with unexpected events such as those with a probability of 0.
Zhao (2017) [26] also considers the probabilistic belief and focuses on unexpected information, especially when the information takes the form "event A is more likely than event B" such that it contradicts to the DM's initial belief. He characterizes the Pseudo-Bayesian updating rule in which the DM updates another prior that is closest to the initial belief in terms of Kullback-Leibler divergence and is subject to the constraint specified in the unexpected information.
When the information is ambiguous yet the DM is ambiguity neutral and forms a single prior belief, Suleymanov (2018) [25] characterizes the Robust Maximum Likelihood updating rule in which the DM revises her initial belief according to the maximum likelihood of the observed event. Namely, the DM is an expected utility maximizer both ex-ante and conditionally, yet the posterior is not updated from the prior. Thus the main difference between the Robust Maximum Likelihood and ML as well as RML (Relative Maximum Likelihood) is that the latter updating rules require that the posteriors have to be updated from the subset of those priors that represent the DM's ex-ante preference. In other words, RML necessarily reduces to Bayesian updating when the DM's ex-ante preference is represented by expected utility, which is not true for Robust Maximum Likelihood updating.
In cases where the initial belief is a set of priors, one way of refining is to rule out priors from the initial set. Epstein and Schneider (2007) [6] proposes an updating rule without characterization, such that the refining is done according to some relative likelihood ratio test. RML belongs to this category of ruling out priors, more importantly, there is a connection between RML and the relative likelihood ratio test. In fact, RML rules out a prior if it fails the relative likelihood ratio test, but it may also rule out some priors that pass the test. The dynamic consistent updating rule characterized in Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) [10] also features ruling out priors, and the criteria there is to maintain the optimality of the ex-ante preferred act.
Yet another way of refining is to consider a different set of priors, where it is possible that some priors are not included in the initial belief. Ortoleva (2014) [18] characterizes the hypothesis testing updating rule for multiple priors: if the likelihood of the observed event is too low under some prior in the initial belief, then the DM will revise her initial belief and change to another set of priors for updating.
When the initial belief further involves confidence ranking proposed by Hill (2013) [12] , based on a similar motivation, Hill (2019) [13] characterizes an updating rule under this framework which also features in refining initial belief by the information received, and it include FB and ML as special cases as well.
Except for the theoretical development on this idea of revising and refining initial belief, De Filippis et al. (2019) [3] also identifies such behavior in a social learning experiment. Their finding suggests that the non-Bayesian behavior observed in the experiment is consistent with a generalized ML updating rule where subjects revise their initial belief according to the information they receive. Gul and Pesendorfer (2019) [9] observe a common unintuitive feature of both FB and ML that is "all news is bad news". Namely, a DM sometimes find that the ex-ante preferred alternative is dominated by another alternative no matter what the realization of the signal is. Imposing the "not all news can be bad news" axiom, they characterize an updating by proxy rule for preferences admitting CEU representation with capacities that are totally monotone. Notice that the set of preferences that qualify for proxy updating is a strict subset of the preferences considered in the present paper. In cases where both updating rules apply, RML and updating by proxy are indeed two totally different types of updating rules that come out of different considerations and result in different predictions. Especially, updating by proxy sometimes does not preserve any ambiguity from the ambiguous signals, whereas RML allows for all possible extents of ambiguity to be preserved from those signals.
Finally, in many applications of ambiguity, FB is the only updating rule that is being considered (Bose and Renou 2014 [2] , Beauchene et al. 2018 [1] , Kellner and Le Quement 2018 [15] ). Then, a natural question is whether the results in these application papers are robust to the weakening of the FB assumption. In this sense, not only does RML provide a unifying model that includes different types of updating rules for application, but also its parametrization will be useful for further comparative statics analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the environment and provides the characterization of ML under MEU preferences; section 3 is the main part which defines RML and provides preference foundation; section 4 applies RML in an ambiguous signal example and compares it with other updating rules; section 5 uses an example to illustrate the implication of weakening the assumption on updating from FB to RML in an ambiguous persuasion environment; section 6 characterizes another updating rule which is related to RML but in addition preserves comonotonic independence for the conditional preferences; and section 7 provides concluding remarks. Let Ω be the set of states of the world with at least three states 5 , endowed with a sigma-algebra Σ of events with generic element E. Let X be the set of all simple (i.e. finite-support) lotteries over an unbounded set of consequences Z (i.e. there is no maximal consequence under the ex-ante preference) and let x denote a generic element of X. Let F denote the set of bounded acts, meaning that each f ∈ F is a bounded Σ-measurable function from Ω to X. With conventional abuse of notation, denote a constant act which maps all states ω ∈ Ω to x simply by x.
The primitive is a family of preferences { E } E∈Σ over all acts f ∈ F. Let Ω ≡ denote the ex-ante preference and for all the other E ∈ Σ, let E denote the conditional preference when event E occurs. ( ∅ is irrelevant.)
First of all, assume that the ex-ante preference admits a Maxmin Expected Utility representation and is represented by a set C ⊆ ∆(Ω) and an affine utility function u such that for all f, g ∈ F:
where u(f ) denote the random variable Y : Ω → R such that Y (ω) = u(f (ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω and call u(f ) the utility profile of act f . In addition, assume that has finitely many plausible priors 6 .
The finitely many plausible priors assumption is extremely useful to express the key intuition and simplify the statement of axioms at the same time. All characterizations can be achieved without this assumption by different axioms as shown in the appendix. 7 Furthermore, this assumption still allows for many popular cases in application of multiple priors, such as the -contamination.
For each E ∈ Σ, for any f, g ∈ F, let f E g denote an act that maps all ω ∈ E to f (ω) and maps all ω ∈ E c to g(ω). An event E is -nonnull if for all x, x ∈ X such that x
x , x E x x . Under MEU preference, an event E is -nonnull if and only if p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ C.
For each -nonnull E ∈ Σ, assume that the conditional preference E also admits a Maxmin Expected Utility representation and is represented by a set C E ⊆ ∆(Ω) and the same utility function u such that for all f, g ∈ F:
Meanwhile, the conditional preference E for -null E is unrestricted.
Finally, assume that the conditional preferences are consequentialist: first, for all p ∈ C E , p(E) = 1, i.e. the complement of the conditional event is irrelevant for conditional preference; and second, ex-ante preference and conditional event E completely determine the conditional preference E , which rules out the possibility that the updating rule may depend on feasible set of acts.
All properties assumed for the primitive have axiomatize foundations:
• Maxmin Expected Utility representation: axioms from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) [7] .
• Finitely many plausible priors: no local hedging axiom from Siniscalchi (2006) [22] .
• u is independent of E: state independence axiom from Pires (2002) [19] or unchanged tastes axiom from Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) [10] .
• Consequentialist: null complement axiom and independence from feasible sets axiom from Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) [10] . 6 Plausible priors are defined in Siniscalchi (2005) , under MEU, it equivalently means that the set C is a polytope in ∆(Ω), and a polytope in a vector space is a convex and closed set with finitely many extreme points. 7 The appendix gives the characterization of ML, and RML can be achieved in a similar manner.
Setting up in this way enables the establishing of a clean if and only if connection between the key axioms and the updating rules. For example, the primitive { E } E∈Σ is represented by FB if the following holds for all -nonnull E ∈ Σ and for all f ∈ F:
i.e. the conditional preferences are represented by the set of posteriors of C. Pires (2002) [19] provides the axiomatization of FB updating, and her result can be simplified, in this framework, to the statement that { E } E∈Σ is represented by FB if and only if the following axiom (which is exactly her A9 axiom) holds:
Notice that under MEU, for all f ∈ F an x ∈ X such that f ∼ E x always exists.
Maximum Likelihood Updating
Definition 2.1 (ML). The primitive { E } E∈Σ is represented by ML updating if the following holds for all -nonnull E ∈ Σ and for all f ∈ F:
In other words, the conditional preference E for -nonnull E is represented by the set of posteriors that updated from the priors attain maximum likelihood of event E.
When the ex-ante preference admits both MEU and CEU representations and the acts are uniformly bounded: there exists a maximum consequence x * ∈ X such that max ω∈Ω f (ω) x * for all f ∈ F, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) [8] show that, ML is characterized by contingent reasoning for maximum consequence:
Axiom CR-MC (Contingent Reasoning for Maximum Consequence). For all -nonnull event
CR-MC axiom states that, the DM's ex-ante evaluation of the act f E x * is given by her contingent reasoning with respect to the event E. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) [8] offer a "pessimistic" interpretation of this behavior: the DM's conditional preference of an act f comes from the consideration that the maximum consequence would have been received had the complement event happened. Given this consideration, the DM would use contingent reasoning whenever the maximum consequence is given on the complement event. This type of CR will be called the pessimistic CR in the following.
However, when the ex-ante preference admits only MEU representation, in some case, the maximum consequence may not be good enough to trigger the DM's pessimistic CR as shown in the following example. Example 2. Consider a state space Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }, denote any p ∈ ∆(Ω) by a vector with three coordinates p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) such that p 1 + p 2 + p 3 = 1. Consider a set C ⊆ ∆(Ω) that is a convex hull of the following three extreme points: (1/2, 0, 1/2), (0, 1/2, 1/2) and (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Let X = R with utility function u(x) = x. Let the acts be bounded by x * = 1 and consider an act f pays 1 at ω 1 , pays 0 at ω 2 and is undetermined on state ω 3 . Let the conditional event E be the two states {ω 1 , ω 2 }.
If the conditional preference is represented by ML updating, as C * (E) contains only the extreme point (1/3,
The CR-MC axiom implies that f E x * should be indifferent to 1/2 E x * when x * = 1. However, it is actually the case that
i.e. the CR-MC axiom is false. Notice that, if the act f E 1 is evaluated at the extreme point (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), which is the implication of pessimistic CR, then it is actually the case that f E 1 ∼ 1/2 E 1.
It seems that pessimistic CR is indeed a necessary feature of ML updating, but when this evaluation of the act is not the minimum over all priors, the DM's ex-ante preference will not necessarily be given by this type of CR. Thus, the next step is to consider when does pessimistic CR results in a minimum evaluation of the act among all priors. Intuitively, once the consequence on the complement event is sufficiently large, the first order issue for a DM with MEU preference would become to assign minimum probability on the complement event. Figure 1 is a graphical illustration of example 2 to show that f ω 1 ,ω 2 1 is not evaluated at the extreme point (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), i.e. minimizing the probability of consequence 1 is not the first order issue. Yet, if there is no maximum consequence, the arrow indicates how the act f ω 1 ,ω 2 x would be changing (in angle) if one increases the consequence x. Intuitively from this graph, when x is sufficiently large, eventually f ω 1 ,ω 2 x will be evaluated at the extreme point (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), and furthermore, it should remain true for all even better consequences. (When x goes to infinity, the act eventually will be parallel to the bottom line of the triangle.) In these cases, minimizing the probability of x becomes the first order issue for MEU preference.
The final piece of intuition is given by the fact that C contains only finitely many extreme points. It guarantees the existence of a threshold for any act f ∈ F and any conditional event E such that for all consequences on the complement event that are greater than this threshold, the pessimistic CR evaluation of an act is indeed the minimum among all priors. 8 In summary, the pessimistic CR behavior is more precisely the contingent reasoning for large consequences, which says that CR applies whenever the consequence on the complement event is sufficiently large: Note that the existence ofx E,f is guaranteed by assumptions on the primitives, it should not be treated as a requirement of this axiom, the same comment applies to all future axioms.
Comparing the CR-LC axiom and the CR-MC axiom implies that, under MEU, the maximum consequence sometimes are not large enough to trigger the DM's pessimistic CR behavior. Nonetheless, the qualitative interpretation of both axioms are essentially the same. Furthermore, except for the pessimistic interpretation provided by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) [8] , in section 3, from a different point of view, these axioms can also be interpreted as "optimism".
The following theorem shows that CR-LC axiom is necessary and sufficient for ML updating under MEU. 
Relative Maximum Likelihood Updating

Representation
To capture an intermediate updating behavior between FB and ML, the present paper proposes the following updating rule called RML. Let C denote the set of probabilities that represents the ex-ante preference and let C * (E) be the the set of priors in C that attain maximum likelihood of event E. For some α ∈ [0, 1], the conditional preference E for any -nonnull E ∈ Σ under RML is represented by set of posteriors that are updated from the following set of priors:
Geometrically, as illustrated in Figure 2 , the set C α (E) is a linear contraction of the set C with C * (E) being the center.
Observe that when α = 0, means the DM has no relative attitudes towards ML; then C α (E) coincides with C and the updating rule is exactly FB. On the contrary, α = 1 captures a DM that has extreme attitudes towards ML; thus C α (E) becomes C * (E) and the updating rule reduces to ML. All the other α ∈ (0, 1) capture the intermediate updating behaviors, and the set C α (E) shrinks when α increases. In addition, the parameter α can also be regarded as a threshold of a relative likelihood ratio test. Since for all p ∈ C α (E),
i.e. RML selects a prior for updating only if it passes this relative likelihood ratio test. LetĈ α (E) denote the set of priors that pass this test.
Then apparently it is the case that C α (E) ⊆Ĉ α (E); however it could be a strict subset. Figure  2 illustrates a scenario where C α (E) Ĉ α (E). In figure 2, the triangle abc represents the simplex of probability distributions over the three states a, b and c. The larger hexagon represents the set of priors C and when E = {a, b} the bottom line of it represents C * (E). Then the blue shaded area is C α (E) = (1 − α)C + αC * (E) for some α ∈ (0, 1) and the area below the red dashed line isĈ
Hence the area below the red dashed line yet is not in C α (E) represents the priors that pass the α likelihood ratio test, but not being selected under C α (E).
such that the following holds for all -nonnull E ∈ Σ and for all f ∈ F:
Preference Foundation
The first fundamental intuition for RML is indeed the fact that a DM may find both FB and ML to be too extreme for updating beliefs. Recall that FB and ML imply two different types of CR:
A DM who finds FB and ML to be too extreme would necessarily update some set C(E) such that C * (E) ⊆ C(E) ⊆ C. As a result, the two CR conditions will no longer hold for this type of conditional preference. In particular, the DM would systematically undershoot her ex-ante preference when evaluating the act f E x and overshoot when evaluating the act f E x * :
Axiom U-O (Undershooting for conditional certainty equivalence and Overshooting for large consequences) For all -nonnull event E ∈ Σ and for all f ∈ F,
In the following, the exact intuition on why these two directions will be provided: First, look at CR-CCE. For any f ∈ F, this DM's conditional evaluation of f , indifferent to some consequence x, would be weakly higher than her conditional evaluation of it if she updated the entire set of priors C. Suppose in that case she is conditionally indifferent between f and another consequence x . Since the latter case satisfies CR-CCE, her indifference implies that f E x ∼ x under her ex-ante preference.
As x x and the difference between f E x and f E x is smaller than the difference between x and x , thus under her ex-ante preference it is the case that f E x x. Therefore, such a DM sometimes violates CR-CCE in the direction that f ∼ E x implies f E x x. For this reason, it is being said that the DM undershoots her ex-ante preference for f E x while doing CR with respect to x.
The above illustration is also proved in Proposition 12 of Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) [10] . They deem this property as "information improves the worst-case", noticing that it is also equiv-
Therefore, in this sense, a DM who updates a subset of C is actually being "optimistic" since she raises her conditional evaluation of the act f compared to updating the entire C. Given our restriction that C * (E) ⊆ C(E) ⊆ C, the ML updating DM is indeed the most optimistic one since her conditional evaluation would be the highest among updating all such C(E).
Next, consider CR-LC. For any f ∈ F, such DM's conditional evaluation of f , indifferent to some x, would now be weakly lower than her conditional evaluation of it if she updated the set C * (E). Suppose in that case she is conditionally indifferent between f and some x . Since the latter case satisfies CR-LC, her indifference implies that f E x * ∼ x E x * for all sufficient large x * under her ex-ante preference.
As x x and by monotonicity, it is necessarily the case that f E x * x E x * . Therefore, such a DM violates the CR-LC axiom in the direction that if f ∼ E x then f E x *
x E x * for all sufficiently large x * . Similarly, this violation describes a scenario in which the DM overshoots her ex-ante preference for f E x * compared to x E x * while doing CR with respect to sufficiently large consequences.
In summary, the U-O axiom is necessary for a DM who updates some intermediate set. More importantly, applying a similar separating hyperplane argument as in the proof of the Proposition 12 of Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) [10] is further able to show that the U-O axiom is sufficient.
The proof of this proposition is standard thus omitted in the present paper.
All the intuitions about a DM may not update as extreme as either FB or ML are all captured by the U-O axiom. Proposition 3.2 shows that it only suffice to pin down some intermediate set to represent her preference, yet it does not offer any characterization of a specific set that a DM may find reasonable to update.
A further implication of the U-O axiom, and it is also the key insight for further characterization is that, fix any f ∈ F, for all sufficiently large consequence x * (not only greater thanx E,f , but also greater than x and make f E x * be evaluated at some p ∈ C * (E)), the following weak preferences hold:
where CE(f ) denote the certainty equivalence of an act f under ex-ante preference. Furthermore,
Equation (1) suggests that, even though the DM may violate both CR-CCE and CR-LC, there is still some connection between her ex-ante and conditional preferences. Especially, this connection requires only to compare the DM's ex-ante preference with respect to conditional certainty equivalence x and some sufficiently large consequence x * .
As the linear relation is true for all acts f ∈ F, one can further restrict that the DM should be consistent over all acts when relating her ex-ante preference to conditional preference. Consistent in a way such that, if she is conditionally indifferent between two acts f and g, furthermore, she finds that when she receives large consequences on the complement event, she is also indifferent between the acts f E x * and g E x * ex-ante, then she would also be indifferent ex-ante when the conditional certainty equivalence is received on the complement event, i.e. f E x ∼ g E x. Notice that, CR-LC may sometimes contradict to this consistency, since under CR-LC, whenever
Therefore, in the following axiom, I treat these two cases separately such that at least one of these two cases has to be true:
Axiom AC (Act Consistency). For all -nonnull event E ∈ Σ, for all f and g ∈ F, at least one of the following scenarios hold:
Intuition for the first scenario is the same as the CR-LC axiom. For the second scenario, it is a weaker version of the CR-CCE axiom. It says that the DM applies CR-CCE to compare f E x and g E x under her ex-ante preference, only when she finds that she is also indifferent from f E x * and g E x * , i.e. CR-LC holds for these two acts.
In other words, the two acts f, g are not only indifferent under conditional preference, but they are also "pessimistically similar" in the sense that the DM finds indifference ex-ante when sufficiently large consequence is received on the complement event. Only when both conditions are true, the DM finds that she is also indifferent ex-ante when the conditional certainty equivalence is received on the complement event, i.e. CR-CCE holds.
This axiom is sufficient to characterize a constant α[E, f ] for all f ∈ F for each -nonnull event E. Sketch of proof of Theorem 3.3. For sufficiency of the U-O and AC axiom, fix any -nonnull E ∈ F, the proof proceeds by the following three steps:
Step 1. For all f ∈ F, there exists α[E, f ] such that for all sufficiently large consequences x * ∈ X on has
where CE(f ) denotes the certainty equivalence of the act f . The quantifier "sufficiently large" means that x * needs to be greater than the following three thresholds:
Step 2. Equation (2) implies that the DM's conditional evaluation of any f ∈ F can be represented by
By plugging into the expression of each certainty equivalence in equation (2), one is able to show that there exists another MEU preference , which is represented by the set
Then it further implies that the conditional evaluation of the act f , equals to u(x), also can be represented by a FB updating of preference .
Step 3. The AC axiom implies that α[E, f ] needs to be the same across all f ∈ F and it is
In other words, the conditional preference are given by both FB and ML, which further implies C = C * (E). Thus, if C = C * (E), then there exists at least one
For any λ ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ X, let f λ y denote the mixture λf + (1 − λ)y of an act f and the consequence y. Equation (2) 
If the first scenario of AC axiom holds, since it is equivalent to CR-LC axiom, it would imply that α[E, f ] = 1 for all f ∈ F.
If the first scenario is false, AC axiom further implies that the second scenario must hold. For any g ∈ F that cannot be obtained from f by the two operations that preserves α[E, f ], one can always construct an g lλ y such that the following two conditions hold: This feature is not true when characterizing FB or ML updating by imposing CR-CCE or CR-LC axiom respectively. Since the CR-CCE axiom or CR-LC axiom uniquely pins down the conditional preference to be represented by the constant 0 or 1 respectively for each event E. Thus imposing either axiom would necessarily pin down a constant α = 0 or 1 across all the events. In contrast, if one imposes only the U-O and AC axioms, it could well be the case that the same DM updates with FB (α = 0) for event E and updates with ML (α = 1) for another event E .
On one hand, it might not be necessary to restrict a DM's updating behavior across different events. For example, it is reasonable for a DM who wants to make more inference (larger α) when the maximum likelihood of the observed event is relative low. Thus only imposing the U-O and AC axioms allows for such flexibility across different events.
On the other hand, for the convenience of using RML in applications, and also for RML to provide sharper predictions of behaviors, one can also characterize a constant α across all events by adding the following axiom:
Axiom EC (Event Consistency). For all -nonnull events E 1 and E 2 , for all f, g ∈ F and for all x ∈ X, at least one of the following scenarios hold:
The EC axiom, similar to the interpretation of the AC axiom, captures the intuition that when the DM relates her ex-ante preference with respect to conditional preference by equation (1), it should be further consistent across different events. The second scenario is the main statement about this consistency, yet it also contradicts to the implication of CR-LC axiom when α = 1, thus one also needs the first scenario to take care of that special case.
For the second scenario, notice that if CR-CCE is true,
Thus the second scenario is, again, a weaker version of this implication. When the two acts f and g, not only have the same conditional certainty equivalence under event E 1 and E 2 respectively, but also indifference ex-ante when some specific sufficiently large consequences are received on each complement event, the DM find it is also true that f E 1 x ∼ g E 2 x. In other words, the DM's conditional preference for different events are related to her ex-ante preference in a somewhat consistent manner.
Eventually, imposing all three axioms (U-O, AC and EC) would sufficiently characterize the RML updating rule with α ∈ [0, 1] being constant across all events and acts. Given Theorem 3.3, the only remaining proof is to show EC axiom is necessary and sufficient to characterize a constant α across all events. While a detailed proof can be found in the appendix, from the similarity between AC and EC axiom, the argument here is almost the same as in step 3 of the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Remark Recall that -nonnull E are defined as the events such that p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ C. However, for -null event E such that p(E) > 0 for some p ∈ C, all the arguments in the proof follows 10 since p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ C α (E) when α ∈ (0, 1]. The proof only fails when α = 0, in which RML reduces to FB, and Pires (2002) [19] shows that the CR-CCE axiom is only sufficient
Learning from Ambiguous Signals
Example 1 represents a class of environments in which the DM has a probabilistic belief about the payoff-relevant states while there is also some ambiguous signal that she could utilize to potentially refine and update her belief about the true state. For example, a decision problem may have been encountered repeatedly such that the distribution of the true states could be learned from the historical data. Meanwhile for the current problem, an additional new data set might be available to the DM. This data set is potentially informative for the true state from her knowledge about the data; however, the exact correlation between the data and the states is unknown.
In this case, the DM may be cautious about the data set and updates her belief only with the knowledge she has, or she may make a further inference about the correlations given the data she observes. Thus how informative the DM finds the data as well as her conditional belief will crucially depend on her view of this ambiguous signal. RML provides one possible parametrization of exactly such an attitude.
In the following, I take the running example from Gul and Pesendorfer (2019) [9] , which in fact involves learning from an ambiguous signal, to illustrate how RML is applied in this environment. Moreover, an example of a comparative statics result with respect to the parameter α will be provided. Finally, the updating behaviors under RML will be compared to updating by proxy rule in this example.
Example 3. Two balls are drawn consecutively from separate urns. The first draw is unambiguous while the second draw is not. The agent bets on the first draw after observing the second. The first ball is drawn from an urn consisting of one ball labeled R and a second ball labeled G. If R is drawn, the second ball is drawn from urn I; if G is drawn the second draw is from urn II. Both urn I and urn II contains 12 balls, each one either red or green. Urn I contains at least 4 red and at least 2 green balls while urn II contains at least 4 green and at least 2 red balls.
The DM observes the second draw (r or g) and, conditional on that draw, evaluates a bet f that pays 1 if the first draw is R, and 0 otherwise.
The payoff-relevant states are Θ = {R, G} corresponding to the two colors in the first draw with known probability 1/2. The signals S = {r, g} are the colors in the second draw and the correlation between signals and states is ambiguous because the composition of the two urns I and II are only partially known. Furthermore, the signals are potentially informative about the first draw since the knowledge of the compositions implies that the signal r is "overall more likely" to be drawn from urn I. The probability of observing an r in the second draw conditional on the first draw being R or G is given by an interval of probabilities:
Notice that the lower and upper bound of p(r|R) are greater than the lower and upper bound of p(r|G) respectively, reflecting the fact that r is "overall more likely" to be drawn from urn I. Also note that the possible correlations are discrete in the description of the example, yet for convenience of analysis I assume the DM also considers all possible lotteries between different compositions, thus generating the whole convex hull of possible correlations.
Consider the grand state space Ω = {R, G} × {r, g}, each µ ∈ [0, 1] and λ ∈ [0, 1] together specify a prior p µ,λ in the initial belief C:
Suppose the DM observes that the second draw is r, then for each λ and µ her posterior of the true state being R is given by
If the DM is cautious and updates only with her knowledge, then she would follow FB updating such that she updates every prior in her initial belief, i.e. updates every µ and λ. Then the set of her posteriors is the following:
π F B (R|r) = [1/3, 5/6] and she evaluates the bet f which pays on R with the minimum posterior 1/3. 11 If the DM makes an inference with respect to likelihood and follows ML updating, since the likelihood of r is given by the probability p µ,λ ({R, G}×r) = 1/2·[1/3+1/2µ]+1/2·[1/6+1/2λ] and is maximized when µ = λ = 1, then she updates only that prior, resulting in a singleton for her updated belief:
π M L (R|r) = 5/9
Now suppose a DM updates under RML with arbitrary α ∈ [0, 1], then the first step is to identify the set of priors C α (E) = (1 − α)C + αC * (E) that is being updated.
In this example, as C * (E) is a singleton and is obtained when µ = λ = 1, the set C α (E) is actually very straightforward: Under RML, the DM's conditional evaluation of the bet f is increasing with respect to α. In this example, a pessimistic DM who evaluates f with respect to the worst correlation would always treat the urn II(G) as having the maximum number of red balls. Thus her conditional evaluation of f depends on the minimum number of red balls in the urn I(R) in her updated belief. After she observes the signal r, she would infer that it might suggest there are relatively more red balls in the urn I(R) than the minimum possible number of red balls. The parameter α captures exactly the extent of such an inference, and a greater α means that she infers there are more red balls in the urn I(R). In other words, for a DM who is more willing to make an inference about the composition of the urn I(R), i.e. with greater α, r would become a more informative signal for the state R to her and thus raise her evaluation of the bet.
Gul and Pesendorfer (2019) [9] find that both FB and ML may result in an unintuitive prediction that "all news is bad news". Namely, under these rules a DM sometimes finds that the ex-ante preferred alternative is dominated by another one no matter what the realization of the signal is. Since both FB and ML are special cases of RML, thus RML would also suffer from such critique for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Finally, Gul and Pesendorfer (2019) [9] characterize the updating by proxy rule by the axiom requires that 'not all news can be bad news'. In this example, updating by proxy implies that the DM forms the following "proxy urns" such that as if the signals are generated by them: p * (r|R) = 7/12 p * (r|G) = 5/12
Then the DM's posterior would be equivalently given by the Bayesian updating of the correlation given by the proxy urns. That is, her posterior after observing r is also a singleton: π proxy (R|r) = 7/12
For the present paper, I emphasize on two main differences between RML and updating by proxy in this single example. First, notice that there does not exist an α ∈ [0, 1] such that the DM's conditional evaluation of the bet coincides with updating by proxy, confirming the fact that updating by proxy and RML are indeed two different updating rules coming from totally different motivations.
Second, in this example, proxy by updating treats ambiguous signals unambiguously, which may result in an unintuitive prediction such that a DM finds indifference between an ambiguous signal and a probabilistic signal no matter what the realization of the signal is. In contrast, RML does not always result in such prediction. Different value of the parameter α captures different extent of inference the DM is willing to make with respect to the signal she observes. It allows a DM to preserve most of the ambiguity from the ambiguous signal (small α) or to exclude most of the ambiguity from the ambiguous signal (large α). In this sense, RML provides more flexibility for one to model different kinds of updating behaviors with respect to ambiguous signals.
Robust Ambiguous Persuasion: An Example
In a persuasion environment where the sender and receiver have a common prior about the true states, the sender can commit to some signaling structure to induce desired actions from the receiver. Bayesian persuasion describes the case where the available signaling structures or devices are probabilistic. If the sender also has access to ambiguous devices such that each of them specifies a set of probabilistic devices and the probability of using any one of them is unknown, Beauchene et al. (2019) [1] show that when the receiver updates her belief with FB, the sender is able to gain strictly more payoff from some ambiguous device than from using only probabilistic devices.
Notice that once the sender commits to an ambiguous device, from the receiver's point of view, it is indeed a learning from ambiguous signals problem. Thus, all our intuitions and discussions about making an inference about the plausibility of priors also apply. Then the assumption that the receiver updates only with FB becomes rather restrictive, as it considers only a special case of a large family of different attitudes towards such inference that is captured by RML. Naturally, the immediate question is whether the conclusions in Beauchene et al. (2019) [1] are robust to the relaxation of this assumption.
In the following, with an example I show that if the receiver's conditional preference is assumed to be given by RML with all possible α ∈ [0, 1], then first, the previously optimal ambiguous device can no longer induce the same action from the receiver for some α ∈ [0, 1] and in fact it induces the same action if and only if α = 0; in other words FB is a sharp assumption for the optimal ambiguous device to be effective. Second, in this example there still exists an ambiguous device such that induces the desired action from the receiver and makes a strictly higher payoff than using probabilistic devices for all α ∈ [0, 1]. From the second statement, one is able to provide a robust ambiguous persuasion scheme in the sense that it is robustly optimal for all possible updating behaviors given by RML.
The ω l ω h a l (-1,3) (-1,-1) a m (0,2) (0,2) a h (1,-1) (1, 3) where in each cell, the first number is sender's payoff and the second is receiver's.
The payoff structure of this example is standard for persuasion, where the sender always prefers the receiver to take higher actions yet the receiver prefers to choose an action that matches the state.
The following discussions come from Beauchene et al. (2019) [1] , I refer to their paper for more detailed explanation.
When the receiver updates with FB, the optimal ambiguous device can be constructed by the following two steps: first, identify the base probabilistic devices that generate the desired set of posteriors, and then construct each probabilistic device by using a strong synonym such that hedges against the sender's ambiguity.
In this example, let {m l , m h } be the set of signals and then the base probabilistic devices π 1 and π 2 are:
If the sender's ambiguous device consists of these two base devices, then the receiver would form the following set of posteriors:
where the first and second posterior in each set is updated from the first and second base device respectively. Given these posteriors, the receiver with MEU preference would take action a m when signal m l is realized and takes action a h when signal m h is realized. The posterior p(ω h |m l ) = 1/4 is crucial since any posterior that assigns less probability on ω h would induce the receiver to take action a l and makes the sender worse off.
The receiver's behavior is fixed by the set of posteriors, yet the sender's evaluation of the ambiguous device may also be affected by the existence of ambiguity. To hedge against the sender's own ambiguity, consider a duplicated set of signals {m l , m h , m l , m h } and the following probabilistic device: π 1 = λπ 1 ⊕ (1 − λ)π 2 , which represents a device sending message {m l , m h } with probability λ according to the base device π 1 and sending message {m l , m h } with probability (1 − λ) according to π 2 . It can be easily verified that under this device, the receiver's posterior coincides with π 1 when m ∈ {m l , m h } and coincides with π 2 when m ∈ {m l , m h }.
Then consider the following two probabilistic devices constructed in the same manner π 1 = λπ 1 ⊕ (1 − λ)π 2 and π 2 = (1 − λ)π 2 ⊕ λπ 1 :
When m ∈ {m l , m h }, the posterior of π 1 coincides with π 1 and the posterior of π 2 coincides with π 2 , so that the set of posteriors generated by the ambiguous device Π = {π 1 , π 2 } remains the same as the base devices. Furthermore, the sender's payoff under the probabilistic device π 1 and π 2 are the same; thus they hedge against her ambiguity. And the payoff from persuasion is increasing with respect to λ for λ ∈ (0, 1); hence the optimal ambiguous persuasion is Π with λ → 1. [1] construct the optimal ambiguous persuasion scheme for this example. In the following, I'm going to argue, if one relaxes the assumption from FB to RML, this device will no longer be optimal:
In summary, Beauchene et al. (2019)
Notice that the likelihoods of generating the signals are different for the two devices when λ → 1. Let l i (m) denote the likelihood of generating signal m under device π i :
When λ → 1, apparently the likelihood of generating signal m l is higher for device π 1 compared to device π 2 . Then if the receiver instead updates her belief with ML, she will update the signal m l only with respect to the first device, resulting in a single posterior p(ω h |m l ) = 0 which induces the receiver to take action a l instead of a m .
In this case, the sender's payoff is strictly worse than the optimal Bayesian persuasion. Furthermore, notice that the action a m is induced if and only if the posterior 1/4 exists in the DM's updated beliefs, and the probabilistic device that results in 1/4 has the minimum likelihood of generating the signals m l and m l . Thus, under this ambiguous device, the action a m is induced if and only if the DM updates by RML with α = 0, which is indeed the FB updating.
Therefore, the previously optimal ambiguous device is not robust to the relaxation of FB assumption. Nonetheless, it is still possible to identify some ambiguous device that is robust to such relaxation and better than Bayesian persuasion.
Note that when λ = 3/5, the likelihood of generating signal m l by device π 1 and π 2 becomes the same and it is also true for m l . Then, a RML updating receiver would always update with respect to both devices no matter what the α is. Her set of posteriors would coincide with the posteriors updated from FB, thus inducing her to take the sender's desired action a m . Furthermore, even though the likelihood of generating m h and m h is not the same across the two devices, as the posteriors are the same, these signals can always induce the same action a h from the receiver.
Therefore, the ambiguous persuasion device Π with λ = 3/5 is actually robust in the sense that it induces the same action from a RML updating receiver for all possible values of α ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, the sender's payoff from this device is strictly higher than Bayesian persuasion, yet it is also strictly lower than the optimal device for the FB updating receiver. (The optimal Bayesian persuasion payoff is obtained when λ = 0, and the sender's payoff is increasing with respect to λ when the receiver's action is fixed; thus λ = 3/5, gives a strictly higher payoff than Bayesian persuasion, yet it is strictly worse than λ = 1 had the receiver updated with FB.) 6 Preferences with Comonotonic Independence 6.1 Extended FB Defined in Schmeidler (1989) [20] , two acts f and g are said to be comonotonic if for no ω and ω in Ω, f (ω) f (ω ) and g(ω ) g(ω). The comonotonic independence axiom states that for all pairwise comonotonic acts f, g and h, and for all λ ∈ [0, 1]:
If a MEU preference further satisfies the comonotonic independence axiom, then it also admits a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) representation with a convex capacity 12 ν:
Furthermore, the core of the convex capacity coincides with the set of priors that represents the same preference under MEU. In other words, such preference admits both MEU and CEU representations and denote this type of preferences by ∈MEU∩CEU hereafter. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) [8] show that comonotonic independence is preserved under ML updating. In other words, if ∈MEU∩CEU and E is represented by ML updating, then E ∈MEU∩CEU as well.
However, this property is not generally true for other updating rules. Horie (2013) [14] shows that FB updating does not preserve comonotonic independence: given a set of priors that is the core of some convex capacity, the set of posteriors updated from FB may not be a core of any convex capacity.
In fact, there exists another updating rule that preserves comonotonic independence known as the Fagin-Halpern (FH) rule, which also has been called the "FB" updating rule for CEU preferences (Eichberger et al. 2007[4] ). Yet Horie (2013) [14] 's finding suggests that FH and FB are actually two different updating rules that result in different conditional preferences. The conditional preference E is given by FH updating if it is represented by the following capacity:
It is (mistakenly) regarded as "FB" updating since for any event A,
where C denotes the core of convex capacity ν that represents the ex-ante preference. It says that under the FH rule, the capacity of any event A coincides with the minimum probability of A under FB updating. In fact, the core of ν F H E is the lower envelope of the set of posteriors given by FB updating. In the language of multiple priors, the FH rule describes an updating rule that first updates by FB, then extends the set of posteriors to the lower envelope that is also the core of a convex capacity. For this reason, I hereafter call the FH rule the Extended FB updating rule.
The axiomatization of Extended FB is also provided in Horie (2013) [14] . In addition to the assumptions on primitives given in section 2, in this section only, further assume that both the ex-ante preference and all the conditional preferences E for all -nonnull E, satisfy the comonotonic independence axiom, i.e. all those preferences are in MEU∩CEU.
Define F 2 E to be the set of conditional binary acts, that is for each f ∈ F 2 E , there exists some Horie's (2013) [14] result shows that { E } E∈Σ is represented by Extended FB updating if and only if the following axiom holds:
Axiom CR-CCE* (Contingent Reasoning for Conditional Certainty Equivalence*). For all -nonnull E ∈ Σ and for all f
Notice the difference between the CR-CCE axiom and the CR-CCE* axiom here. CR-CCE* is actually weaker than CR-CCE since it imposes the CR-CCE requirement only over conditional binary acts, which is a subset of the acts considered in the CR-CCE axiom.
The reason why such weakening is still sufficient to characterize the Extended FB is because of the fact that comonotonic independence imposes a strong restriction on the shape of the set of priors. In particular, the core of a convex capacity is a polytope in the space of ∆(Ω) subject to the following constraints:
Therefore, such a set can be sufficiently pinned down by considering the minimum probability of every event E, which results in the sufficiency for looking only at conditional binary acts.
On the other hand, when X is bounded, ML updating in this case is characterized by the CR-MC axiom as shown in Gilboa and Schmeidler(1993) [8] . In the case where X is unbounded, it is also easy to see that ML can be characterized by the following axiom:
Axiom CR-LC* (Contingent Reasoning for Large Consequences*). For all -nonnull E ∈ Σ and for all f
By the same reason, it is also suffice for CR-LC* axiom to only look at conditional binary acts. Furthermore, as discussed in Remark 4.3 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) [8] , when X is unbounded, it suffice to let the threshold for large consequences be the maximal consequence of the act f for states in E.
For CEU representation, the conditional preference given by ML updating is represented by the following convex capacity:
Extended RML
Since FB does not preserve comonotonic independence, RML for the same reason, will not preserve comonotonic independence as well. Then, for a counterpart of RML in the current setting, a family of different updating rules called Extended Relative Maximum Likelihood (Extended RML) will be characterized in the following, and it is extended in the same sense as Extended FB. 
The following proposition shows that, first, this ν E is a convex capacity for all α ∈ [0, 1] and thus is able to represent a comonotonic independent preference. Furthermore, it agrees with RML updating on the upper and lower bound of probabilities of each event. Therefore, Extended RML also describes an updating rule that extends the set of posteriors updated from RML with the same α to its lower envelope that is the core of some convex capacity. Because of the connection between RML and Extended RML, the axioms that characterize Extended RML are very similar to the axioms that characterize RML, and they all share the same intuition. Thus, in the following I state all the axioms without further interpretation:
Axiom U-O* (Undershooting for conditional certainty equivalence and Overshooting for large consequences*). For all -nonnull E ∈ Σ, for all f ∈ F 2 E and for all
Axiom AC* (Act Consistency*). For all -nonnull E ∈ Σ, for all f and g ∈ F 2 E , at least one of the following scenarios hold:
Axiom EC* (Event Consistency*) For any -nonnull events E 1 and E 2 , for all f, g ∈ F 2 E , at least one of the following scenarios hold:
The following theorem shows that these three axioms characterize Extended RML. Remark. The proof here applies basically the same argument in the proof of Theorem 3.3 and 3.4. Thus, the U-O* and AC* axiom is also necessary and sufficient for a type of Extended RML in which the parameter α[E] may be different for different events.
Concluding Remarks
The idea of revising and refining initial belief as new information arrives is absent in the Bayesian updating. When the true probability law that governs the uncertainty is known, one cannot further refine her initial belief but can only update it with the new information. However, in scenarios where the underlying probability law is unknown, the DM needs to form a conjecture of her belief to represent the uncertainty for decision. Whether the conjecture is a singleton or a set of probabilities, it seems too stringent to require the DM to always stick with her initial conjecture despite new information she might receive. Thus the absence of revising initial belief in Bayesian updating actually reflexes the DM's confidence about her initial belief or conjecture. Then updating rules that do not reflex such confidence and allow the DM to freely revise and refine her initial belief should also be reasonable.
As mentioned in the related literature section, several different approaches have been proposed to capture the situation where initial belief is probabilistic. For when initial belief is a set of priors, the present paper provides the characterization of a large family of updating rules that is able to capture a full range of different attitudes towards such reexamination of initial belief. Especially, RML unifies the two popular updating rules FB and ML as two extreme special cases. It thus provides foundation for applications to consider all these updating rules together.
Appendix A Proofs of the results
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Necessity. The necessity of CR-LC axiom for ML updating is proved via the following three lemmas: 
where the third equality follows from p(E) = p * (E) for all p ∈ C * (E), the last equality follows from the fact that u(x * ) ≥ u(x) as x * x. p∈C Ω u(f E x)dp = min p∈C * (E) Ω u(f E x)dp. Towards a contradiction suppose there also exists x such that x
x as well as
Then from this strict inequality one can further derive (let p * (E) denote max p∈C p(E)):
Notice that, for the LHS of the last inequality, minimum of Ω u(f E x)dp can be obtained at some p ∈ C * (E) which also minimizes the second term (u(x ) − u(x))(p * (E) − p(E)), since for all p ∈ C, p * (E) − p(E) ≥ 0. Thus the minimum of LHS is obtained at some p with p(E) = p * (E) and it implies
which is a contradiction.
Lemma A.3. If admits MEU representation with finitely many plausible priors, then for all -nonnull E ∈ Σ, for all f ∈ F, anx E,f ∈ X such that min p∈C Ω u(f ExE,f )dp = min p∈C * (E) Ω u(f ExE,f )dp andx E,f E f always exists.
Proof of Lemma A.3. Given X is unbounded, for each f ∈ F, anx E,f E f always exists. Next to show that, when C contains only finitely many extreme points, anx E,f such that f ExE,f is evaluated at some extreme point in C * (E) always exists.
Let q be any extreme point in C * (E) and let p be any extreme point in C. The act f ExE,f is evaluated at q if for all p ∈ C,
It can be further derived as
Notice that the first term of both LHS and RHS is fixed, furthermore, (1 − q(E)) ≤ (1 − p(E)) as q ∈ C * (E). When p is also in C * (E), the value ofx E,f does not matter and one can pin down the q ∈ C * (E) such that minimizes the evaluation of f ExE,f among all extreme points in C * (E).
Fix that q, and then for extreme points not in C * (E), the following inequality becomes strict:
Then for all f, p, E there always exists anx E,f,p such that the inequality (3) holds. Since there are only finitely many extreme points in C, max px E,f,p exists. Finally, given Lemma A.2, it suffice to letx E,f be max{max px E,f,p , x} for x ∼ E f .
In summary, for any -nonnull E ∈ Σ and act f ∈ F, Lemma A.2 and A.3 together show the existence of a thresholdx E,f such that for all larger consequence x * , the evaluation of the act f E x * is given by some prior that attain maximum likelihood of event E. Then Lemma A.1 shows that, when E is given by ML updating, and f E x * is evaluated at maximum likelihood prior,
Sufficiency. For sufficiency of CR-LC axiom, fix any -nonnull E ∈ Σ, consider the contra positive statement: not ML updating implies not CR-LC.
Let C E be the set of posteriors represents the conditional preference E . Not ML updating implies that C E = { p p(E) : p ∈ C * (E)}. In other words, either there existsp ∈ C * (E) such that p p(E) / ∈ C E , or there exists q ∈ C E such that q / ∈ { p p(E) : p ∈ C * (E)} or both. Not CR-LC means that there exists f ∈ F and x ∈ X such that f ∼ E x and for allx ∈ X, there exists x * ∈ X such that x * x and it is not the case
For the two different cases of not ML, since both C E and { p p(E) : p ∈ C * (E)} are convex and closed set, the same type of separating hyperplane argument can be applied to both cases. Thus the proof here only shows the implication of the first case, while the same argument applies to the other case.
Formally, in the first case, there existsp ∈ C * (E) such thatp p(E) / ∈ C E , strong separating hyperplane theorem implies that there exists an act f ∈ F such that E u(f ) dp p(E) < min
Then first asp ∈ C * (E), one has min p∈C * (E) E u(f ) dp p(E) ≤ E u(f ) dp p(E) . Second, for any x ∈ X, f ∼ E x implies that min p∈C E E u(f )dp = u(x). These inequalities and equality together imply that
On the other hand by Lemma A.3, there always exists anx E,f such thatx E,f x and for all
Then for any x * x E,f , the following is true (let p * (E) denote max p∈C p(E)):
That is, for this f ∈ F, for anȳ x ∈ X, there always exists x * x such that it is not the case f E x * ∼ x E x * , i.e. the CR-LC axiom is not true.
The argument for the second case is analogously the same and combining both cases shows that not ML updating implies not CR-LC.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
The necessity of the U-O axiom is discussed after introducing the axiom. The necessity of the AC axiom is immediate when one plug a constant α[E, f ] into equation (1) For sufficiency, fix any -nonnull E ∈ Σ, the proof proceeds by the following steps:
Step 1: Show that for all f ∈ F, there exists α[E, f ] such that for all sufficiently large consequence x * ∈ X one has
where CE(f ) denote the certainty equivalence of the act f . Furthermore,
First consider all x * ∈ X such that x * x E,f and x * x, then the following inequalities hold: f E x *
x E x * x f E x, which further implies that, for each x * , there always exists an α[E, f ] ∈ [0, 1] such that the following equation holds:
Notice that, α[E, f ] here may depend on the value of x * because the act f E x * could be evaluated at different extreme points for different x * . However, in the case where f E x * is always evaluated at the extreme points in C * (E), as both u(CE(f E x * )) and u(CE(x E x * )) have the common term u(x * )(1 − max p∈C p(E)) which cancels out, α[E, f ] does not depend on the value of x * any more. By Lemma A.2 and A.3, for all f ∈ F, there exists another thresholdx E,f such that for all x * x E,f , one has min p∈C Ω u(f E x * )dp = min p∈C * (E) Ω u(f E x * )dp Therefore, there exists α[E, f ] such that the following is true for all x * max{x E,f , x,x E,f }: 13
Step 2 Equation (4) implies that the DM's conditional evaluation of any f ∈ F can be represented by
For all x * max{x E,f , x,x E,f }, the LHS of equation (4) can further be derived as (let p * (E) denote max p∈C p(E)):
where the second equality follows from x * x E,f . On the other hand, the RHS of equation (4) can also be derived as
Observe that now equalizing the LHS and RHS of equation (4) implies
Finally, from the last equality one can further derive
Since E is -nonnull, p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ C, the last equality further implies
which represents the conditional evaluation of f under E since f ∼ E x. That is, the conditional evaluation of any act f ∈ F is given by
Step 3. AC axiom implies α[E, f ] is constant across all f ∈ F, and it is unique if C = C * (E). When α[E] is not unique. If there does not exists any f ∈ F such that α[E, f ] is unique. Then by step 1, for all f ∈ F and x ∈ X such that f ∼ E x, it implies that both f E x ∼ x and f E x * ∼ x E x * for all sufficiently large x * hold.
Then it is the case in which both the CR-CCE axiom and the CR-LC axiom hold at the same time. Namely, the conditional preference E can be represented by both FB and ML, and it further implies C = C * (E). In other words, C = C * (E) implies that there exists at least an f ∈ F such that α[E, f ] is unique.
Two operations on acts that preserve α[E, f ]. For any l ∈ R ++ , let f l denote an act such that u(f l (ω)) = l · u(f (ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω. i.e. the utility profile of f l is a linear transformation of the utility profile of f .
For all x * that are sufficiently large for both f and f l , equation (4) for f l implies that
on the other hand, f ∼ E x also implies that
Next, for any y ∈ X, for any λ ∈ [0, 1] consider the act f λ y = λf + (1 − λ)y, which is an Anscombe-Aumann mixture of acts. By certainty independence, f ∼ E x implies that f λ y ∼ E λx+(1−λ)y. Let x λ y ∈ X denote the consequence on the RHS. Then for all x * that are sufficiently large for f and f λ y, equation (4) for f λ y implies that
where the first equality follows from Anscombe-Aumann mixture, the second equality also follows from certainty independence.
Then one can further derive
which further implies that Next, suppose the first scenario of AC axiom is false, then AC axiom further implies that the second scenario must be true.
For any g ∈ F such that cannot be obtained from f by the two operations preserve α[E, f ]. Without loss of generality, I normalize its utility profile such that u(g(ω)) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ E. Consider the act g lλ y for any l ∈ R ++ , λ ∈ (0, 1] and y ∈ X. By previous result, α[E, g lλ y] = α[E, g], thus it suffice to show that α[E, f ] = α[E, g lλ y] for some l ∈ R ++ , λ ∈ (0, 1] 14 and y ∈ X.
As the conditional preference E admits MEU representation, let it be represented by the set C E . Let p f and p g denote the extreme points in C E that evaluate the act f and g respectively. By certainty independence, the act g lλ y is also evaluated at the same extreme point as g.
Then f ∼ E g lλ y when
Next, for all x * that are sufficiently large for f and g lλ y, consider the condition g lλE x * ∼ f E x * , which is equivalent to
where the last equality follows from p(E) = p * (E) for all p ∈ C * (E).
For the set of posteriors of C * (E), let q f and q g denote the two extreme points that evaluate the act f and g respectively. Again, the act g lλ y is also evaluated at the same extreme point as g. Thus, the above condition can also be written as
Consider the following construction: In a two dimensional space, draw the two points (1, u(f ) · q f ) and (1, u(f ) · p f ) as well as the two points (2, u(g l ) · q g ) and (2, u(g l ) · p g ). Notice that, by U-O axiom, the set C E is a superset of the set of posteriors of C * (E), thus it is necessarily the case that u(f ) · q f ≥ u(f ) · p f and u(g l ) · q g ≥ u(g l ) · p g . Now for different possibilities of the two inequalities:
In this case, consider when g = x in the second scenario of the AC axiom. The first equality
Then the second scenario of the AC axiom would imply that f E x ∼ x. By step 1, both f E x ∼ x E x * and f E x ∼ x holds imply that α[E, f ] is not unique, a contradiction to the current assumption.
This case is symmetry to the first case, and it necessarily implies that α[E, g] is not unique. Then it suffice to let α[E, g] = α[E, f ] for this case.
In this case, α[E, f ] = 1 because p f = q f . In the following one can further show that the second scenario of the AC axiom implies that α[E, f ] = α[E, g].
Consider in the Case 3, find l ∈ R ++ such that the following two strict inequalities hold:
Since both LHS of the inequalities are increasing with respect to l, thus one can always find such l (recall our normalization u(g(ω)) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ E). Once l is identified, draw two straight lines, one connects (1, u(f ) · q f ), (2, u(g k ) · q g ) and the other one connects (1, u(f ) · p f ), (2, u(g k ) · p g ). By construction, these two lines must intersect at some point on the southwest of the point (1, u(f ) · p f ), and denote it by (z, u(y)). Then the desired λ is given by 1−z 2−z and this g lλ y satisfies the two conditions:
f ∼ E g lλ y and f E x * ∼ [g lλ y] E x * In the following, I abuse notation to use g denote the act g lλ y such that two conditions above hold.
By step 1, f ∼ E x implies that
and g ∼ E x also implies that
Consider the LHS of equation (6) and denote it by L:
Meanwhile the RHS of equation (6) denoted by R can be further derived to
Notice that by equation (5), R also equals to
Then as L = R, one has
Further notice that
where the last equality follows from 
Add the term u(x)(1−p * (E)) to both sides of the first inequality and combine both inequalities and recall that one of them has to be strict yield:
Denote it by In the following I show that, EC implies α to be a constant across all -nonnull events.
First of all, consider the case there does not exists any -nonnull E ∈ Σ such that C = C * (E). Then it implies that all p ∈ C agree with the probability of all -nonnull event E, i.e. those with p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ C. Namely, all p ∈ C agree on the probability of all nonnull E ∈ Σ.
Next, suppose there exists only one -nonnull event E such that α[E] is unique, then it suffice to let α[E] be the constant α across all events.
Lastly, when there exists at least two -nonnull events, E 1 and E 2 , such that both α[E 1 ] and α[E 2 ] are unique. Find any f ∈ F and x ∈ X such that f ∼ E 1 x, and find g ∈ F such that g ∼ E 2 x. For all x * ∈ X that are sufficiently large for act f under event E 1 and for act g under event E 2 . (The same definition as in the proof of Theorem 3.3), identify two consequences x * 1 and
If the first scenario of the EC axiom is true, equation (7) and (8) Fix any f ∈ F such that f ∼ E 1 x. For any g ∈ F, let g l denote the act such that u(g l (ω)) = l · u(g(ω)) where normalize u such that u(g(ω)) is non-negative for all ω ∈ E 2 . Then for any consequence y ∈ X, for any λ ∈ [0, 1], let the act g lλ y denote the mixture λg l + (1 − λ)y of the act g l and consequence y. It is important to notice that the act g lλ y is always evaluated at the same extreme point as g.
Then let p f denote the extreme point in C E 1 that evaluates the act f , and let p g denote the extreme point in C E 2 that evaluates the act g.
Then g lλ y ∼ E 2 x when
Further, since f ∼ E 1 x, it is also suffice to let
Next, for all x * that are sufficiently large for f under E 1 and g lλ y under E 2 , consider the condition
where p * (E 1 ) denotes max p∈C p(E 1 ) and p * (E 2 ) is defined accordingly.
Let q f and q g be the two extreme points in C * (E 1 ) and C * (E 2 ) that evaluates f and g lλ y respectively, then the last equality can be written as:
Furthermore as the condition x E 1 x * 1 ∼ x E 2 x * 2 implies that u(x)p * (E 1 ) + u(x * 1 )(1 − p * (E 1 )) = u(x)p * (E 2 ) + u(x * 2 )(1 − p * (E 2 ))
i.e. u(x * 1 )(1 − p * (E 1 )) − u(x * 2 )(1 − p * (E 2 )) = u(x)[p * (E 2 ) − p * (E 1 )] As E 1 and E 2 are chosen arbitrarily, without loss of generality to let p * (E 2 ) − p * (E 1 ) ≥ 0 and also normalize u such that u(x) ≥ 0.
Then
Again, since both α[E 1 ] and α[E 2 ] are unique, the set represents the conditional preference is a superset of the corresponding set of posteriors of maximum likelihood priors. Thus the following two inequality are still necessarily true: u(f ) · q f ≥ u(f ) · p f and u(g k ) · q g ≥ u(g k ) · p g . For different possibilities of the two inequalities:
• Case 1 Either u(f ) · q f = u(f ) · p f or u(g k ) · q g = u(g k ) · p g . Under this case, without loss of generality assume the first equality is true. Consider g = x in the second scenario of the EC axiom. The equality implies that when f ∼ E 1 x, one has f E 1 x * 2 ∼ x E 2 x * 2 as well. Then the second scenario of EC would imply that f E 1 x ∼ x. By step 1 in the proof of Theorem 3.3, it further implies that α[E 1 ] is not unique, a contradiction to the current assumption.
• Case 2 u(f ) · q f > u(f ) · p f and u(g k ) · q g > u(g k ) · p g .
In this case, both α[E 1 ] and α[E 2 ] cannot be 1.
Consider in the Case 2, given our normalization, it is also the case that u(f )·q f +u(x)[p * (E 2 )− p * (E 1 )] > u(f ) · p f and u(g l ) · q g > u(g l ) · p g . Now for a slight different construction from the one in proof of Theorem 3.3:
In a two dimensional space, draw the two points (1, u(f ) · q f + u(x)[p * (E 2 ) − p * (E 1 )]) and (1, u(f ) · p f ) as well as the two points (2, u(g l ) · q g ) and (2, u(g l ) · p g ).
First find l ∈ R ++ such that the following two strict inequalities hold:
Since both LHS of the inequalities are increasing with respect to l, thus one can always find such l. Once l is identified, draw two straight lines, one cross (1, u(f ) · q f ), (2, u(g l ) · q g ) and the other one cross (1, u(f ) · p f + u(x)[p * (E 2 ) − p * (E 1 )]), (2, u(g l ) · p g ). These two lines must intersect at some point on the southwest of the point (1, u(f ) · p f ), and denote it by (z, u(y)). Then the desired λ is given by 1−z 2−z , and such g lλ y satisfies the two conditions in the second scenario of EC.
From this point on, apply exactly the same argument in step 3 of the proof of Theorem 3.3 would imply that α[E 1 ] = α[E 2 ], and furthermore α[E] needs to be a constant across all -nonnull E ∈ Σ.
To conclude, combining the two cases (α[E 1 ] = 1 and α[E 1 ] = 1) imply that α is a constant across all -nonnull event E. Furthermore, α is unique if there exists -nonnull E ∈ Σ such that not all p ∈ C agree on p(E).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6.2 I first show the second statement of this proposition.
As C α (E) = (1 − α)C + αC * (E), any p ∈ C α can be written as p = (1 − α)q 1 + αq 2 for some q 1 ∈ C and q 2 ∈ C * (E). Define a capacity ν such that for any A ∈ Σ, where the second equality comes from definition of C with respect to ν, the forth equality comes from the fact that p(E c ) is constant for p ∈ C * (E), the fifth equality is the crucial step comes from the fact that by convexity of ν there exists p ∈ C * (A c ∩ E) ∩ C * (E) ∩ C * (A c ∪ E) such that is exactly the one minimizes the term, the sixth equality is also by definition.
For the fifth equality, notice that Since A c ∩ E ⊂ E ⊂ A c ∪ E, by convexity (comonotonicity) of ν, there exists p ∈ C * (A c ∩ E) ∩ C * (E) ∩ C * (A c ∪ E), therefore the fifth equality above. 15 15 A more detailed explanation can be found in appendix C.
It is easy to show that ν is a convex capacity as ν (A ∪ B) + ν (A ∩ B) ≥ ν (A) + ν (B) by convexity of ν.
Then by property of Extended FB updating when capacity is convex we have where the first part is non negative implies that the second part is also non negative. Therefore, for any > 0 there existsx E,f, such that min p∈C * (E) Ω u(f E x * )dp − min
p∈C Ω u(f E x * )dp < for all x * x E,f, .
For necessity of the ACR-LC axiom, recall Lemma A.1 implies that if f ∼ E x then under ML updating min p∈C * (E) Ω u(f E x * )dp = min p∈C Ω u(x E x * )dp Thus for any > 0 there existsx E,f, such that u(x E x * )dp − min
p∈C Ω u(f E x * )dp
= min
p∈C Ω u(x E x * )dp − min p∈C * (E) Ω u(f E x * )dp + min p∈C * (E) Ω u(f E x * )dp − min
Appendix C Core of a Convex Capacity
In this section, I provide an equivalent characterization of a set of priors being the core of a convex capacity. It is more apparent to understand what properties of beliefs result in comonotonic independence. Fix a set of priors C, a sequence of events A 1 ⊆ A 2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ A n ⊆ Ω are called comonotonic events if the following holds: C * (A 1 ) ∩ C * (A 2 ) ∩ · · · ∩ C * (A n ) = ∅ in other words, for the sequence of events, there exists a probability measure in C such that attains the maximum likelihood of all events in the sequence simultaneously. It suggests sort of 'separability' between events that are comonotonic in the prior belief such that whether one event achieves its maximum likelihood or not does not affect whether the other events can achieve their maximum likelihood.
A set C is comonotonic if all sequence of events are comonotonic events, which gives the characterization of the core of convex capacity:
Proposition C.1. A convex and compact set C is the core of a convex capacity if and only if it is comonotonic.
The proof of this proposition is given by Theorem 2 in Shapley (1971) [21] . The implication is that, a CEU∩MEU preference is represented by some belief such that are 'separable' across all events. Furthermore, the comonotonic property of the set C is indeed corresponding to the comonotonic independence axiom.
If two acts f, g are comonotonic, then there exists a sequence of events A 1 ⊆ A 2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ A n ⊆ Ω such that f and g can be expressed as
Ω∩A c n where f 1 ≤ f 2 ≤ · · · ≤ f n+1 and g 1 ≤ g 2 ≤ · · · ≤ g n+1 . By comonotonic of C, both f and g can be evaluated at the same probability measure that belongs to C * (A 1 ) ∩ C * (A 2 ) ∩ · · · ∩ C * (A n ).
Then for pairwise comonotonic f, g and h, as all of them can be evaluated at the same probability measure, independence holds.
